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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LEHI IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant} 
vs. 
CLARENCE T. JONES and ED. H. 
WATSON, State Engineer of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 7189 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Comes now the appellant and respectfully prays the 
court to grant a rehearing of this cause on the following 
grounds, namely: 
1. The court has fallen into senous and fundamental 
error in its statement that certain letters of the State Engineer 
are the ((very foundation of this appeal, and the trial de novo 
in the district court," whereas the appeal is founded on the 
facts and their legal effect-the findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and decree of the District Court, and neither the said 
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4 
letters or any part of them are either relevant or material in 
any sense or degree whatever. 
2. The court has fallen into fundamental error in holding 
the decision controlled by the pronouncements of this court 
in Little Cottonwood Water Company vs. Kimball, 76 Utah 
243, 289 P. 116, whereas they were stated as the effect of 
a statute different from that in force at the time of and con-
trolling in this cause. 
3. The court has fallen into fundamental error in finding 
that the waters in question are those within the scope of the 
approved application 12144 of the United States and never-
theless holding them subject to appropriation by Respondent. 
4. The court has fallen into serious and fundamental 
error in holding that as between the owner of an approved 
application for right to the use of water and a subsequent 
applicant for right to use from the same source, the burden is 
upon the one prior in time and right to establish interference or 
conflict by the latter rather than the contrary as required by 
Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 100, Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
5. The court has fallen into s'erious and fundamental 
error in holding, contrary to the former decisions of this court, 
that one who seeks to appropriate water from or near the 
source of supply of one with prior rights to use from that 
source has not the burden of proving no interference. 
6. The court has fallen into fundamental error in failing 
and refusing to decide whether under the facts found and 
before it a~d the issue so made and argued, the waters in 
question are or are not the subject of appropriation. 
7. The court has fallen into serious and fundamental 
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error in stating, HThere are no vested rights with which this 
application 'vill interfere-at least no such rights are called 
to attention of the court,'' when as a matter of fact the attention 
of the court was expressly called to the vested rights of the 
United States tttotally irreconcilable with approval of the Jones 
applications.'' SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
Skeen, Thurman and Worsley, Attorneys for Appellant, and 
D. A. Skeen, a member of the firm, do hereby certify that 
in their opinion there is good reason to believe that the judg-
ment of the court herein is erroneous and that the cause 
ought to be re-examined. . 
SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY and 
D. A. SKEEN. 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
I join in the foregoing application and certificate. 
FISHER HARRIS, 
Amicus Curiae 
BRIEF 
1.- The court has fallen into serious and fundamental 
error in its statement that certain letters of the State 
Engineer are the tcvery foundation of this appeal, 
and the trial de novo in the district court," whereas 
the appeal is founded on . the facts and their legal 
effect-the findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
decree of the District Court, and neither the said 
letters or any part of them are either relevant 
or material in any sense or degree whatever. 
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The letter of the State Engineer, fifty-seven lines of which 
are quoted in the opinion of the court, gives the reasons in 
response to which he approved the Jones applications. But 
this is not an appeal from the decision of the State Engineer; 
this is an appeal from the decision of the Fourth District Court 
which on appeal from the decision of the Engineer tried the 
cause de novo, and even if that were not so-even if the cause 
were now before the District Court the ((opinion" of the 
Engineer would be of no more consequence-no more nearly 
the ((very foundation of the case"-than the opinion of a 
Justice of the Peace or Judge of a city court in a case on trial 
de novo before the District Court. 
The facts found to be such by the District Court, those 
which are known by the court as such, its conclusions and 
decree are the ((very foundation of this appeal," and neither 
the letter quoted or any part of it is either relevant or material 
in any sense or degree to the appeal. 
What weight was given by this court to the letter quoted 
from at considerable length cannot be objectively determined, 
but it is necessarily inferable that it materially affected its 
decision. 
If it had been proper to notice and to comment upon 
the letter of the Engineer it would have been appropriate 
to notice and determine the effect of the fact that he, like the 
trial court, gave no consideration to the rights of the United 
States; both asserting in effect that which counsel for Respondent 
Jones and the Attorney General again and again asserted 
explicitly, namely that ((this is a private law suit between two 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
small water users" and so that the interests and rights of the 
ttDeer Creek Project, not only had not been considered, but 
ought not to have been. 
It was this which was characterized by Amicus Curire as 
Hutterly and obviously frivolous,, he suggesting in response 
that the case ought to be Hremanded in any event, so that, 
at least, there shall be same approach to compliance with the 
real essence of the law.'' 
2. The court has fallen into fundamental error in hold-
ing the decision controlled by the pronouncements 
of this court in Little Cottonwood Water Company 
vs. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116, whereas they 
were stated as the effect of a statute different from 
that in force at the time of and controlling in this 
cause. 
In the first place, what was said in Little Cottonwood 
Water Company vs. Kimball, and so often since, in relation to 
the duties of the State Engineer, was pure dictum, for the court 
having decided that water lost by seepage and evaporation from 
an open ditch was the subject of appropriation by one who pro-
posed to save it, there was a clear and indisputably affirmative 
showing of unappropriated water, and there was no occasion 
whatever for a lengthy or any dissertation at all upon the 
duty of the Engineer in a doubtful case. 
Passing that, however, the statute interpreted in the 
majority opinion was of very different effect from that which is 
applicable to the facts of this case. 
The fact of this difference was called to the attention of 
the court by Amicus Curiae in his original brief, page 11: 
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((The statute makes it of the very essence of approval, 
that there be found to be runappropriated water in the 
proposed source,' and, whether before the State En-
gineer or the District Court, if there is nothing from 
which that fact may be determined the application must 
be rejected, for the sufficient and simple and compelling 
reason that the fundamental prerequisite to approval 
is lacking. 
((The necessary implications of the statute are so obvious 
that anything aditional must be superogatory; never-
theless it is significant that prior to amendment by 
the legislature in 1939 Section 8 of Chapter 3, Title 
100 read, (When there is no unappropriated water 
in the proposed source of supply it shall be the duty 
of the State Engineer to reject such application.' Then, 
(Under the language of the statute' as Chief Justice 
Cherry pointed out in Little Cottonwood Water Com-
pany vs. Kimball at page 248 of 76 Utah, (it is (was) 
not a prerequisite to the approval of an application 
that the State Engineer find affirmatively that there 
is unappropriated water in the proposed source. The 
proposition is stated in the negative, and it is only 
when there is no unappropriated water in the proposed 
source that the application is to be rejected.' It is 
quite otherwise as the Legislature provided in 1939, 
and, for reasons which will at once occur, far better." 
The reasons which it is said ((will at once occur" are 
these: 
Prior to the amendment of the section the water resources 
of the state being relatively undeveloped, it was proper that 
applications for right to appropriate should be approved unless 
there was showing of ((no unappropriated water in the pro-
posed source,'' while since the date of the amendment, and 
the occas1on for it, the fact has been that indiscriminate 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
approval of applications has been more likely to disturb and 
disrupt the exercise of rights already acquired rather than to 
lead to further development of water resources. 
No notice was taken by this court of what was said in 
this regard, and so far as we know no notice has ever been 
taken by this court of the fact and effect of the amendment 
of Section 8 of Chapter 3 of Title 100 of the Code. Those 
who. have been familiar with the course of legislation on the 
subject, and who in some measure have influenced it, are 
of course aware of the purpose of the amendment, but objec-
tively its purpose is quite obvious. We submit that it unequi-
vocally directs a different statement than that made by Chief 
Justice Cherry in Little Cottonwood Water Company vs. Kim-
ball, and that it clearly directs a result the very opposite of that 
announced by this court in the case of Lehi Irrigation Company 
vs. Jones. The statute as amended will not permit in support of 
its decision what the court said in this case: ((It is not clear that 
there is no unappropriated water," for under the statute the 
Jones applications may only be approved upon a finding that 
there ((is unappropriated water in the proposed source." 
3. The court has fallen into fundamental error in 
finding that the waters in question are those within 
the scope of the approved application 12144 of 
the United States and nevertheless holding them 
subject to appropriation by Respondent. 
4. The court has fallen into serious and fundamental 
error in holding that as between the owner of an 
approved application for right to the use of water 
and a subsequent applicant for right to use from the 
same source, the burden is upon the one prior in 
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time and right to establish interference or conflict 
by the later rather than the contrary as required 
by Section 3, Chapter 8, Title 10, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1943. 
5. The court has fallen into serious and fundamental 
error in holding, contrary to the former decisions 
of this court, that one who seeks to appropriate 
water from or near the source of supply of one 
with prior rights to use from that source has not 
the burden of proving no interference. 
These three assignments we think may be discussed as 
one. The court has found that the exchange application No. 
12144 of the United States filed with the State Engineer on 
April 3, 1936, is before the court and that its effects must 
be considered in relation to the applications in question. The 
waters the subject of the Jones applications have been definitely 
determined to be those covered by No. 12144, but this court, 
approving the Jones applications nevertheless, has done so 
on the theory that it is possible that the 30,000 acre feet 
covered by the exchange application may be recovered .without 
recourse to the springs arising by use of the Deer Creek water. 
In other words, it has cast upon the United States the burden 
of proving, in each instance, that the waters found to be 
developed by its efforts are essential to the exercise of rights 
granted to it more than 12 years ago to recover them. 
In this it has ignored the effect of the statute referred to 
and has held that as between the owner of an approved 
application for right to the use of water and a subsequent 
applicant for rights to use from the same source, the burden 
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is upon the one prior in time and right to establish interference 
or conflict, rather than the contrary. Not only is the result 
in conflict with the clear purpose and effect of Section 8 of 
Chapter 3 of Title 100, Utah Code .l\nnotated, 1943, but it 
is in conflict with the rule in the analogous situations presented 
by Peterson vs. Wood, 71 Utah 77, 262 P. 828; Bastian vs. 
Nebeker, 49 Utah 390, 163 U. 1092, and Mountain Lake 
Mining Company vs. Midway Irrigation Company, 47 Utah 
346, 149 P. 929, by which the burden of proof has been defi-
nitely placed upon him who seeks to appropriate water from 
or near the source of supply of one with prior rights to use 
from that source, to show by clear and convincing evidence 
that there will be no interference. 
The effect of thus shifting the burden of proof is such 
as to make the rights of the United States under its application 
12144 impossible of exercise, for in every case and whatever 
the form of action might be, every claimant in the situation 
of Jones would urge what this court has said in this case. 
The result is utterly impracticable, as well as uncon-
scionable against the prior right-unconscionable because there 
is no equity in favor of the applicant in such case. 
The waters in question result from an appropriation made 
from a foreign watershed, and thus have been saved from 
wastage into Great Salt Lake; they .have been stored in a 
reservoir constructed to receive and store them; they have been 
reduced to actual possession by the United States as an essential 
part of the water supply of a great reclamation project. In 
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practical effect they have been created. As early as 1936 the 
United States gave notice that once used they would be re-
covered and re-used for the benefit of an essential part of 
the water supply of the Provo River Project, serving some 
50,000 acres of farm lands and substantially half of the 
population of the State of Utah; and the State of Utah has 
granted the United States the right to recover and reuse them, 
and the right so granted has been confirmed by this court. 
What this court has held and said in this case is totally incon· 
sistent with and utterly destroys the effect of what was decided 
in Tanner vs. Bacon, State Engineer, 103 Utah 494. 
6. The court has fallen into fundamental error in 
failing and refusing to decide whether under the 
facts found and before it and the issue so made and 
argued, the waters in question are or are not the 
subject of appropriation. 
(CW e are not prepared to render an adjudication upon 
the record that is before us, and thus possibly determine 
ultimate rights at this time, but will reserve these matters 
until a proper case brings the issue before us . . . . We are 
reluctant to decide so important a problem as an initial matter 
without having the benefit of proceedings, arguments and 
parties, who may be adversely affected, to aid us in its de-
termination.'' 
Amicus Curire in his final brief, after reciting the facts, 
said this: tel£ those facts are of no legal effect noticeable upon 
application to appropriate the waters so realized, how can 
this court avoid saying so? And if they are-if under those 
facts those waters are not subject to appropriation without 
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showing abandonment by their creator, ho"v can this court 
avoid saying that?'·' 
The court has answered these questions very simply and 
clearly by saying in effect: n\Ve accomplish the avoidance 
of these questions by declining to consider them.'' This 
<:luestion is reserved nuntil a proper case brings the issue before 
us." 
The issue is clearly before the court now, and in a case 
as ttproper" and appropriate as it is possible to conceive. The 
fact that the waters sought to be appropriated by Jones have 
been brought from a foreign watershed. and that they are the 
result of the use of those waters from storage in a reservoir 
constructed to impound them, has been found as a fact by 
the trial court. The facts are indisputably established and 
their legal effect has been asserted on one side and controverted 
on the other. 
How can this or any other matter, important or not, be 
decided other than ccinitially"? The court already has ((the 
benefit of proceedings." It already has the ((arguments;" 
and it has before it the ((parties who may be adversely af-
fected.'' 
As to ((parties who may be adversely affected," as we 
have pointed out before, there is no other party, certainly ?Ot 
Respondent Jones, in behalf of whom any equity may be urged. 
The only matter to be determined is whether or not the fruits 
of the labor of others-in the last analysis the fruits of the 
labor of the stockholders and beneficiaries of the Provo River 
Water Users Association and of the United States, are to be 
conferred upon a stranger. This court either agrees or disagrees 
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with what was said by the federal court in United States vs. 
Haga, 276 Fed. 41, and approved by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Ide vs. United States, 263 U. S. 497, that 
the result advocated here by Appellant and by Amicus Curire 
is directed by ttConsiderations of both public policy and natural 
justice." 
As a matter of fact this Court has already decided, and 
the State Engineer has already decided, that which this Court 
has said in this cause it is reluctant to decide. 
Approval of Application No. 12144 necessarily involved 
a determination of the State Engineer that the right to the 
use of the water the subject of the application belonged 
to the United States; and such a determination was also 
implicit in the decision of the State Engineer, the decision of 
the District Court and in the decjsion of this Court in Tanner 
vs. State Engineer, 103 Utah 494, for prerequisite to the right 
of exchange is the right to the use of the waters exch~nged. 
The right of exchange exists as to no waters whatever except 
those already appropriated. 
The result is that the principles, the foundation of the deci-
sions of Ide vs. U. S. and U. S. vs. Haga, sufficient in themselves 
to affirm the rights of the United States, totally irreconcilable 
with approval of the Jones' applications, have long since been 
affirmed by the State Engineer and by this Court; but this 
Court in Lehi Irrigation Company vs. Jones, in approving the 
Jones' applications, while declining to pass on the question, 
has in effect passed upon it in an effect the very opposite 
to its fanner decision, saying at the same time that the Jones' 
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rights are dependent upon tne iilings of the United States 
and that he ttmust rely" upon then1, Hto secure at least a part, 
if not all, of the water upon which he has filed.'' 
If it be true that the matter has not been argued sufficiently 
extensively, that claim may be obviated by the granting of this 
petition for rehearing, directed as it is on grounds independent 
of this question. 
7. The court has fallen into serious and fundamental 
error in stating, nThere are no vested rights with 
which this application will interfere-at least no 
such rights are called to attention of the court," 
when as a matter of fact the attention of the court 
was expressly called to the vested rights of the 
United States ((totally irreconcilable with approval 
of the Jones' application." 
We are unable to understand what the court has in mind 
unless some peculiar significance attaches to the word ((vested." 
Are we to infer that the right of the United States as the 
creator of the waters in question is .not vested, or that its rights 
under Application 12144 are not? If the latter is intended, 
it ought to have been said in the year 1943 in Tanner vs. 
Bacon, in which event the Provo River Project would probably 
have been abandoned. Instead of which, and in reliance 
upon the decision of this court and its necessary implications, 
some twenty millions of dollars has been expended in the 
construction of works utterly useless if the fundamental water 
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rights of the project are not vested-are subject to the jeopardy 
of such encroachments as are countenanced and encouraged 
by the decision of Lehi Irrigation Company vs. Jones. 
It is respectfully and earnestly submitted that this cause 
ought to be re·examined. 
SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY 
Attorneys for Appellant 
FISHER HARRIS 
Amicus Curiae 
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